Are we living in a golden age of active investing?
Open pdfARE WE LIVING IN A GOLDEN AGE OF ACTIVE INVESTING?
I’m going to start out with two seemingly contradictory ideas: This may be the worst time in decades to be an active portfolio manager and, at the same time, the best time to be a truly active investor. These are not one and the same activities. The average active portfolio manager is largely invested in an index, focuses on relative performance, keeps track of his or her active deviation from that index, and fears losing clients before his or her investment thesis has had a chance to play out. A truly active investor, though, starts from a wholly different place. This investor asks what a particular business is worth and is interested in whether or not its current price offers an adequate margin of safety.
I started investing in the spring of 1993, and since that time I’ve spent every working day in the markets. Over the course of these more than three decades, investing has changed almost beyond recognition. Information that once took days or weeks to acquire now arrives in milliseconds. Trading, which formerly required a telephone and a broker on the other end, now can be done with just a click – even from your kitchen table. Today, we have massive databases, real-time news feeds, satellite imagery, algorithms, factor models, and, of course, AI.
Be all that as it may, I’ve come to a certain conclusion that at first surprised me. The conditions for selecting individual businesses and their shares are perhaps better today than at any time in my career. This is not because today’s markets are any less sophisticated. In fact, they’ve probably never been more sophisticated than they are today. But sophistication and rational price discovery are not the same thing. We’ve created a market with more information, greater computing power, and more frequent trading, and yet perhaps fewer investors than ever before are asking the most fundamental question in finance: What is this business worth?
So, my question today is not whether active funds, as a whole, will outperform the markets. A much more interesting question is, What will happen to price discovery when an ever-growing share of capital doesn’t even ask at all what individual businesses are worth?
The worst time to be average. The best time to be different.
Perhaps we really are living in a golden age of active investing. That would not be because active investing has become easier, but, rather, because modern markets, while becoming increasingly efficient at processing information, are becoming less and less discriminating when it comes to looking at price. More capital than ever before is now allocated based upon companies’ weights in indices, upon the composition of various benchmarks, according to certain systematic rules and short-term risk constraints. Moreover, professional portfolio managers face shorter evaluation periods, stricter limitations, and greater career risks.
This sets up a paradox: For the average active portfolio manager, it may be ever more difficult to beat the market even as the prospect of potentially doing so may be increasingly attractive for a truly active investor who defies average or conventional approaches. Today’s opportunities belong to those who have independent capital, a long investment horizon, valuation discipline, and an ability to tolerate prolonged divergence from the market.
Passive investing has won, and most active managers deserved to lose
Before we turn to the weaknesses of passive investing, I should acknowledge its strengths. Passive investing has reduced fees, offered broad diversification to ordinary investors, eliminated a lot of excessive trading, and protected millions of people from making poor choices as to their portfolio managers and from falling prey to trendy narratives. For most retail investors, a low-cost and well-diversified index fund remains a sensible starting point.
Passive investing won the race to accumulate assets because it solved real problems and because a large portion of actively managed funds offered poor alternatives. Many active money managers charged high fees while, in reality, holding portfolios that closely resembled their benchmarks. A lot of them engaged in excessive trading, were overly diversified, tried always to be in step with the latest investment fads, and focused on quarterly results rather than long-term value. Many of them defined risk as deviation from the index performance rather than as the probability for permanent loss of capital. After fees were factored in, their returns lagged behind their benchmarks.
Nothing has changed about this arithmetic. The phrase “golden age of active investing” must not become an excuse for all actively managed funds or for all investors who buy individual stocks. Activity, differentiation, or concentration do not in and of themselves constitute advantages. The advantage, if it exists at all, comes from the skill of being correct about stock valuations and, at the same time, from possessing the time, capital, and temperament necessary for price and value gradually to converge. Just because active investing is attractive doesn’t mean that the entire active asset management business also has to be attractive.
Passive investing leaves stock valuation to others, while the marginal dollar has changed completely
Passive investment does not at all eliminate the need for stock valuation. Rather, it leaves that work to active investors and relies upon their success in doing so. In a market capitalization-weighted index, market prices determine market capitalization, which, in turn, determines the weights of stocks in the index, and index funds then allocate money according to those weights. The index does not independently value individual stocks. It merely converts existing prices into portfolio allocations. Passive investing therefore means moving further and further away from notions such as investment and asset management and ever closer to the concept of asset accumulation.
This is important because stock prices are determined by the equilibrium between marginal supply and marginal demand for stocks and not because all the shareholders are reassessing the value of their stocks every morning.
The “marginal dollar” has changed dramatically. A growing share, and very probably more than half, of all capital is now coming into the markets through pension plans, target-date funds, index products, systematic strategies, benchmark-linked portfolios, and short-term risk management processes. None of these activities on their own is necessarily irrational. For the most part, however, they are highly insensitive to risk—and, above all, oblivious to the relationship between the prices of stocks and their intrinsic values. Moreover, these activities are carried out on a very large scale.
An investor who cares about stocks valuation should buy more when the price-to-value ratio is attractive and buy less or none at all when that ratio is unattractive. A passive fund that is receiving new cash inflows immediately buys stocks at their current prices, regardless of whether their expected returns have risen or fallen. The crux of the problem is not whether or not passive funds control stock prices. Of course they don’t. It is that passive investing depends entirely on the activities of active investors while at the same time contributing significantly to the fact that the marginal demand for stocks is indifferent with respect to their valuation. The price-discovery process is much slower today than it used to be, while at the same time the price elasticity of the stock market has diminished significantly.
A concentrated index is an active bet without active decision-making
People often describe index investing as some kind of neutral activity, but every portfolio embodies certain assumptions. That certainly is true also of an index portfolio. A market capitalization-weighted index allocates the largest portion of funds to stocks with the largest market capitalizations. This means increasing the weightings of stocks whose prices have risen relative to the overall market and decreasing the weightings of those stocks whose prices have fallen relative to the overall market. Among other reasons, this is due in part, for example, because there are now more passive ETFs in the U.S. than there are individual stocks, and they influence one another’s compositions.
Passive investing has a number of practical advantages. It is scalable, inexpensive, and requires lower-frequency portfolio turnover. That is not to say, however, that it is economically neutral. An index is not the market in any objective, timeless sense. It is a portfolio created by rules, market prices, and the decisions governing boards. In other words, the benchmark has itself become the tool for asset allocation. The more capital that follows that benchmark, the less distinct becomes the line between measuring the market and shaping it. Or, as I write in my book Hidden Investment Treasures, On the whole, this leads to a paradoxical situation wherein indices—which are supposed to be a measure of performance—simultaneously become the goal of investing. Thereby, the index effectively ceases to be a good measure.
Active managers are becoming quasi-passive
Another important point worth mentioning is that the growth of passive investing is not the only factor that is dramatically distorting the markets. Also contributing to that deformation is that many active funds have become de facto quasi-passive.
An active portfolio manager may analyze a number of companies and select individual stocks based on that analysis, and yet that manager’s portfolio often does not differ much from his benchmark, to which he seems to be anchored. Why? Because clients often measure a fund’s relative performance. Because advisors categorize managers according to their styles. Because risk management systems track the portfolio’s active deviations from the benchmark. Because large portfolios require investing into liquid shares. Because the boards that oversee funds evaluate quarterly results. And because fund managers know full well that being wrong on their own is usually far more dangerous for their careers than being wrong along with the crowd.
All of this leads to the creation of portfolios that may differ from indices at the margins but have in common their largest positions, sector allocations, and underlying assumptions. This is what’s known as “closet indexing.” The actual share of active, index-independent money in the markets is, in fact, much smaller than the statistics on actively managed funds would suggest.
The relevant question, therefore, is not how much capital is formally designated as “active.” The question is this: what proportion of capital is both willing and able significantly to disagree with existing prices long enough to prove itself right? I believe that the proportion of such capital in the stock markets today is much smaller than it may seem.
Markets can be fast without being right
This brings us to an important distinction. People sometimes talk about market efficiency as if it were a single concept. But it’s not. There is informational efficiency – that is to say, how quickly public information is reflected in stock prices – and there is fundamental efficiency, which is to say how closely prices correspond to the long-term values of companies. Then, too, there is allocative efficiency, which refers to whether or not capital flows to the highest-value or most-productive use.
Today’s markets may be extraordinarily efficient in that first sense. Once information is publicly released, algorithms process it in a matter of milliseconds. Prices move almost instantaneously. Millions of investors receive the same documents, data, reports, transcripts, and the like at the same moment. A quick reaction, however, does not guarantee a correct interpretation. Investors may process the same data quickly while sharing incorrect assumptions. The market may react rapidly and seemingly correctly to fresh quarterly data and yet be dramatically mistaken about a company’s resilience and competitiveness over the long term. The market may correctly predict a company’s results for tomorrow while at the same time completely misjudging its value. Modern markets can be efficient in milliseconds and inefficient over years.
Or, to put it more simply: Markets can be fast without being right.
When money flows encounter low market elasticity
A provocative contribution to this discussion is the Inelastic Markets Hypothesis, proposed by Xavier Gabaix and Ralph Koijen. According to their estimates, one new dollar allocated to the stock market can increase the aggregate equity market capitalization by as much as five dollars. The exact figure is, of course, open to debate and should not be treated as a physical constant. Nevertheless, the underlying idea is important.
Most investors cannot flexibly adjust their stock portfolios. Funds operate within the constraints of their mandates, their asset allocation rules, benchmark compositions, and risk limits. In practice, it is often difficult to find a theoretical arbitrageur who could freely take the opposite position on every mispricing. If supply and demand are inelastic, then money flows can have a significant and long-term impact on prices regardless of their relative attractiveness.
Price movements often reflect passive capital flows, changes in mandates, and constraints rather than new information about companies’ future cash flows.
Price is fundamentals plus demand and constraints
In a traditional mental model, stock prices change because expectations regarding individual companies’ fundamentals change. In reality, however, prices are influenced by a number of other factors. Fundamentals, yes, but also capital flows, investor mandates, risk constraints, liquidity requirements, leverage, narratives, and the time horizons of investment considerations. This does not mean that fundamentals no longer matter. Over the long term, a company’s financial performance should still be the primary determinant of its value. But in the short and medium term, a company’s share price and its value can diverge significantly.
For a value investor, this presents both an opportunity and a danger. It is an opportunity because large discrepancies between price and value can create substantial investment openings. It is a danger because these discrepancies can grow to be larger than expected and persist longer than anticipated. The very same market structure that creates opportunities can also punish investors who demand quick results. If an investor is to profit from declining price elasticity in the markets, well, he or she must first and foremost be able to survive it.
Information and analysis are abundant. Judgment is rare and precious.
When Benjamin Graham began investing, information itself was scarce. Financial statements were hard to come by. Various data had to be collected by hand. A diligent investor could gain an advantage simply by finding and organizing facts that others had not found. That advantage is long gone. Today, every professional investor has access to enormous amounts of data and financial information. AI makes many parts of the analysis even cheaper and faster. AI can read financial statements, summarize transcripts, translate foreign-language documents, compare competitors, identify accounting changes, and build models. All of this eliminates some analytical advantages. A hard-working analyst whose advantage up to now has been an ability to read and absorb more documents than others should be concerned.
But investing has never been a race to see who can acquire or process more information. It is a contest of judgment. AI can estimate possible outcomes, but it does not eliminate uncertainty. It can calculate a range of values. But it cannot decide for an investor how much uncertainty he or she is willing to bear and what assumptions should be regarded as reasonable. AI can produce a large volume of neat, credible, and increasingly homogeneous analyses. We have managed to solve the problem of information scarcity and have created a glut of reactions. The market is increasingly oversaturated with information and lacks sufficient judgment. AI can commoditize analysis, but sound judgment may become even more rare and more valuable.
Why will most active managers continue to struggle with this?
If opportunities are multiplying and improving, then why will most active managers continue to struggle with the markets? Because the ability to identify an opportunity and the ability to take advantage of it are two distinct things. For example, a portfolio manager may correctly recognize that a stock is undervalued but won’t be able to hold enough of the shares because the company is too small. The manager’s judgment may be correct with a view to a five-year horizon, but he’ll lose his clients within 18 months. It may be obvious to him that an index is very expensive and risky, but he’s unable to maintain and tolerate a larger tracking error. He may need to maintain higher liquidity in the portfolio and therefore have to pass up opportunities that require patience. He may be forced to sell due to client redemptions precisely when expected returns are at their highest. He may be aware that doing nothing is the best choice and yet at the same time be under pressure to demonstrate some kind of activity.
The active asset management industry is not primarily organized to maximize long-term investment returns. It must also raise capital, retain clients, manage its own business risk, and fit within the framework of institutional structures. These are not moral failings, but real constraints. Taken together, however, they mean that theoretical market inefficiencies are not automatically accessible to all professional investors. A favorable game is of no use to a player who cannot play it.
Where lies the fertile ground of opportunity
The argument about the golden age does not mean that every neglected or undervalued company is attractive. Many cheap stocks deserve to be cheap. A lot of smaller companies are subpar businesses. Complexity often obscures the problem rather than some hidden value. The point is that certain market segments offer better potential rewards for investors who are truly seeking value.
Generally speaking, the best places to seek investment opportunity are areas where fewer investors are willing, able, or motivated to look. These often are parts of the market overlooked by the automatic capital flows of passive investors. These may include, for example, smaller and less liquid companies, non-U.S. markets, companies controlled by a key owner, conglomerates, spin-offs, corporate transformations, companies struggling through temporary difficulties, misunderstood cyclical companies, companies whose value is hidden behind accounting complexity, and situations where confirmation of an investor’s thesis will not come quickly. This group may also include companies that large institutions cannot hold for reasons such as liquidity, mandate, reputation, or position size restrictions.
Plant trees, not price targets
One of my favorite activities is planting trees. I enjoy watching them grow afterward. Observing the growth of trees is not a matter of days or weeks. Nothing changes from one day to the next. Even individual months are inconsequential. When you look back years later, however, the difference is enormous. Where once there was nothing, now there is a big forest.
I see a clear analogy here with investing in stocks. When we buy a stock, we’re not buying a line that moves across a screen. We’re buying a stake in a specific company. Its price is visible every second, but its value takes shape much more slowly and more subtly. From quarter to quarter, the changes are small. But here, too, a major change becomes apparent after years.
It’s clear that not every tree we plant will survive. Some of those I planted died. Sometimes it was because I chose them poorly, other times because I didn’t care for them properly, and at still other times for reasons beyond my control. It’s the same with investing. It depends on selection, on care, and on luck. Most important of all, however, is that, if you want to have a large forest, you must first and foremost plant trees. You can draw your own analogy with a stock portfolio.
A golden age for whom?
So, are we living in a golden age of active investing? The answer depends entirely on who we are as investors. It’s clearly not a golden age for funds with high fees. It is not a golden age for hidden indexing. It is not a golden age for investors who define activity by the number of trades. And it decidedly is not a golden age for anyone who believes that being a contrarian must be the same as being right.
We may be in a golden age for investors who meet four conditions: They must be sufficiently independent to position themselves differently from the market. They must be patient enough to wait for value to manifest itself. They must be sufficiently value-oriented to distinguish a good business from a good investment. And they must be psychologically resilient enough to weather periods when it seems the market completely disagrees with them.
These four conditions have always been important, but the current market structure makes them even more valuable precisely because the present financial system discourages one from adhering to those conditions. Passive investing has made it easier for millions of ordinary investors to invest. Technology has democratized information. AI facilitates analysis and makes it more accessible. None of these things, however, eliminates the gap between price and value. On the contrary, they may even underscore the importance of value for those who focus on it.
If information has become widely available, judgment has only become scarcer. If capital flows have become ever more mechanical, independence has become more valuable. And if everyone is watching price, perhaps the greatest advantage springs from watching how a business grows.
So, yes, I do believe we are living in a golden age of active investing. Nonetheless, this golden age is only for those who are prepared to do what the current system discourages: think independently, value conservatively, act selectively, wait patiently, and survive long enough for the trees to grow.
Daniel Gladiš, October 2026
(This text is based on a lecture I delivered at the Ben Graham Center’s 6th European Value Investing Conference in Munich in September 2026.)
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